SPOTLIGHT ON CHINA: because it is safer to enter and exit the U.S. from Canada, the CCP often uses Canada as a staging ground to access sensitive allied data and bypass America's stricter counterespionage scrutiny.

He explained that because it is safer to enter and exit the U.S. from Canada, the CCP often uses Canada as a staging ground to access sensitive allied data and bypass America's stricter counterespionage scrutiny.

While official diplomatic numbers show China has 176 diplomats in Canada—far exceeding numbers from allied nations like Japan—experts and former spies estimate the actual network of CCP operatives and informants in the country could exceed 1,000.

This vast network relies heavily on human intelligence, including recruiting international students to monitor their classmates, photograph dissident gatherings, and plant malware on poorly secured devices. --Spotlight on China

Spy the ChiCom spies.

Here’s a useful guide to detect and expose many of them. https://t.co/3uJTabYIwL

— J Michael Waller (@JMichaelWaller) February 25, 2026

A former Chinese intelligence agent, operating under the pseudonym "Eric," recently shared insights into how Western nations can identify Beijing's undercover spies, following his 2023 defection to Australia. Eric worked for China’s Ministry of Public Security from 2008 until 2022. He claims he was originally a pro-democracy activist who was coerced into espionage under the threat of imprisonment and harm to his family. During his tenure, Eric was tasked with monitoring overseas Chinese dissidents, including the high-profile case of Hua Yong, a vocal critic of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and leader Xi Jinping. Hua eventually fled to Canada but died while kayaking off the coast of British Columbia in late 2022; while the RCMP ruled the death non-suspicious, Eric stated the possibility of CCP involvement "cannot be ruled out." Eric explained that detecting Chinese spies is extremely difficult, even for professional intelligence agencies, due to the high capabilities and effective disguises of some agents. However, he noted a key weakness: agents in authoritarian systems often cannot make independent decisions and must constantly seek approval from their superiors. To test for this, Eric suggests dissidents present complex situations; if an individual consistently stalls, offers vague promises, and requires a long reaction time before making a decision, they may be an agent reporting up the chain. Additionally, he noted that poorly trained or "poorly disguised" agents might display physical signs of guilt or evasiveness, such as shifty eyes and hesitation during conversations. Eric highlighted Canada as a "key target" for CCP infiltration, citing its lenient immigration policies, less robust counterintelligence compared to the U.S., and its valuable membership in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. He explained that because it is safer to enter and exit the U.S. from Canada, the CCP often uses Canada as a staging ground to access sensitive allied data and bypass America's stricter counterespionage scrutiny. While official diplomatic numbers show China has 176 diplomats in Canada—far exceeding numbers from allied nations like Japan—experts and former spies estimate the actual network of CCP operatives and informants in the country could exceed 1,000. This vast network relies heavily on human intelligence, including recruiting international students to monitor their classmates, photograph dissident gatherings, and plant malware on poorly secured devices. Eric stressed that countering the CCP's "human-wave strategy" requires Western intelligence agencies to collaborate closely and actively engage with targeted Chinese communities. He noted that during his own assignments, such as monitoring Hua Yong, he intentionally dragged his feet and avoided providing actionable intelligence like precise residential addresses. Despite his superiors harboring suspicions about his lack of results, Eric explained they were reluctant to launch formal investigations, fearing that exposing a compromised agent would ultimately reflect poorly on their own leadership. After being recalled to China in 2022 and seeing his assignments dwindle, Eric finally seized the opportunity to defect to Australia in early 2023.