ANNA IVERSEN: Greer framed this as a return to the “American System”, the default position for most of U.S. history. In his telling, the post-Cold War era did not “discover” a superior model; it conducted an experiment in hyper-globalisation that constrained the United States while leaving other nations free to use the very American tool kit they had studied and adopted.

Main Street, not Wall Street.
Still trying to make sense of this administration? Susan Kokinda’s latest video says what mainstream media won’t. We’re in an information war—choose your sources wisely. Find her on YouTube and subscribe.   https://t.co/ycnTafpC1a pic.twitter.com/gP4EZjWO46

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Kokinda references Elliott Roosevelt's book, As He Saw It: The Story of the World Conferences of F.D.R., 1946, that covers a few conferences that FDR attended with Churchill, Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek in Casablanca, 1943, Cairo, 1943, Yalta, 1945, and Potsdam, 1945.  Fred Klein at goodreads says that Elliott was not at Yalta,

from Anna Iversen,

At the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer delivered a speech [1][2][3] that was striking, not simply for its historical sweep, but for its clarity about what has been lost in the modern trade debate: the assumption that serious nations will use policy tools—tariffs, targeted support, competition policy, and reciprocal agreements—to develop productive capacity, protect labour from abusive conditions, and avoid structural imbalances.

"From Hamilton to Today: Trade and US Economic Strategy," 

Greer framed this as a return to the “American System”, the default position for most of U.S. history. In his telling, the post-Cold War era did not “discover” a superior model; it conducted an experiment in hyper-globalisation that constrained the United States while leaving other nations free to use the very American tool kit they had studied and adopted.

This is not an argument that tariffs are inherently good policy in all cases; it is an argument that industrial capacity does not arise from market access alone—and that financial architecture determines whether rebuilding is broadly distributive or tacitly extractive.

Whether one agrees with every implication or not, the speech is useful because it brings the conversation back to first principles: economic policy is not merely about cheaper imports; it is about national capacity—industrial depth, supply chain resilience, the dignity of work, and the ability of a society to convert ingenuity into durable production.